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ARKANSAS BEST: A RETURN TO THE
REASONING OF CORN PRODUCTS
VIRGInIA L. BRiGOs*
H. WARD CLASSEN**
With the increased profitability of the stock market, some corporations
bypassed traditional investment opportunities to purchase equity interests in
other corporations.' In an effort to avoid the economic hardships of a
recession, a few corporations diversified their operations by purchasing
smaller corporations with a different product base.2 Still further, other
corporations sold portions of their own corporations or their wholly-owned
subsidiaries in an effort to raise much needed cash.3 These transactions
often combine the mixed motives of investment and the ordinary operation
of a business. As a result of these mixed motives, many unique tax
applications have been created.
These applications usually arise when the corporations sell their equity
interests. The issue then arises as to whether any gain or loss realized should
be treated as an ordinary gain or loss or a capital gain or loss.4 The basis
for examining the proper tax treatment of any such gain is founded upon
the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Corn Products Refining Co.
v. Commissioner. Since 1955 various courts have interpreted this decision
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1. See generally Brandt, Intel Gets Some Help From Its Big Blue Friend, Bus. WK.,
October 20, 1986, at 84; Clash of the Titans, FORTUNE, July 22, 1985, at 10; Finn, General
Eclectic, FoRBEs, March 23, 1987, at 74; MERGERS AND AcQuismoNs, May/June, 1986, at 5
(In 1985, 3,165 merger and acquisition transactions worth $1,000,000 or more occurred. There
were 24 mergers and acquisitions in excess of $1,000,000,000 in 1985, compared with 19 in
1984).
2. See generally Different Cokes, FORTuNE, July 22, 1985, at 12; Edelman Lifts Bid
for Burlington, N.Y. Times, May 28, 1987, at D, col. 6; Time, Inc. Moves into Textbooks,
Bus. Wx., October 27, 1986, at 50; Travenol, in Stock Deal, Will Acquire Caremark, N.Y.
Times, May 12, 1987, at DI, col. 1; United's Low Road, FORTUNE, July 22, 1985, at 11.
3. Alleqis to Sell Canadian Hotels in move Viewed as Anti-Takeover Step, Wall St. J.,
June 3, 1987, at 10, col. 2; Allied to Sell Dillard 31 Stores in South, N.Y. Times, April 14,
1987, at D5, col. 5; Deveny, How Baxter Travenol is Treating its Digestion Problem, Bus.
WK., November 10, 1986, at 69; MERGERS AND Acqtusrbos, March/April 1987, at 12, 67.
4. For a general discussion as to the effects of the Corn Products doctrine, see generally
Troxell & Noall, Judicial Erosion of the Concept of Securities as Capital Assets, 19 TAx L.
REv. 185, 187-88 (1964); Note, The Corn Products Doctrine and its Application to Partnership
Interests, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 341 (1979).
5. 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
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under different factual circumstances, creating a dichotomy among the
jurisdictions.
6
Consequently, it has been unclear whether any gain or loss recognized
upon a distribution in exchange for an equity interest held in a corporation
should be treated as an ordinary gain or loss or a capital gain or loss. The
Supreme Court recently resolved these past uncertainties in Arkansas Best
Corp. v. Commissioner.
7
This Article examines the Supreme Court's decision in Arkansas Best
and explores the development of the Corn Products doctrine. It investigates
the decisions among the various jurisdictions and attempts to reconcile them
in light of Corn Products. Finally, this Article shows that while a corporation
purchasing stock in another corporation may have mixed motives for doing
so, such stock should be treated as a capital asset since stock cannot readily
be characterized as a "hedge" within the exception to Internal Revenue
Code (I.R.C.) Section 1221 set forth in Corn Products.
I. CoRN PRODUCTS REFINING Co. v. CoMIssIONER
The Corn Products Refining Company was a nationally known manu-
facturer of corn by-products which purchased substantial amounts of corn
for refining. 8 The majority of the company's contracts required shipment
within thirty days at a set or market price on the date of delivery, whichever
was lower. The company's facilities enabled it to maintain only a three
week supply of corn, subjecting it to substantial risks from drastic changes
in the market. 9
6. See infra notes 35-123 and accompanying text; see also Schlumberger Technology
Corp. v. United States, 443 F.2d 1115, 1122 (5th Cir. 1971) (purchase of stock and loans to
new company to obtain services of certain individuals); Waterman, Largen & Co. v. United
States, 419 F.2d 845 (Ct. Cl. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 869 (1970); FS Services, Inc. v.
United States, 413 F.2d 548, 555 (Ct. CL. 1969) (taxpayer purchased stock in company to
assure source of supply, and such stock was held to be anon-capital asset); John J. Grier Co.
v. United States, 328 F.2d 163, 165 (7th Cir. 1964) (purchase of stock in order to safeguard
rights under lease covering premises used for a restaurant business); Booth Newspapers, Inc.
v. United States, 303 F.2d 916, 921 (Ct. Cl. 1962) (purchase of stock of paper mill company
to assure taxpayer's supply of newsprint at time of serious shortages of such paper); Inter-
national Flavors & Frangrances Inc. v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 232, 239 (1974), rev'd and
remanded, 524 F.2d 357, 360 (2d Cir. 1975) (gain on sale of pound-sterling short-sale contract
used to hedge investment in British subsidiary); Chemplast, Inc. v. Commissioner, 60 T.C.
623, 633 (1973) (loans to new corporation to acquire services of particular individual); Steadman
v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 369, 380 (1968), af'd, 424 F.2d 1, 2 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 869 (1970) (advance of funds to corporation by attorney to protect his position as its
secretary and general counsel); Electrical Fittings Corp. v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 1026, 1031
(1960) (taxpayer purchased stock in company to assure source of supply, and such stock was
held to be non-capital asset); Commissioner v. Bagley & Sewall Co., 20 T.C. 983, 989 (1953),
aff'd, 221 F.2d 944, 947 (2d Cir. 1955) (loss on government bonds acquired for deposit in
escrow to discharge contract obligation).
7. Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 56 U.S.L.W. 4229 (U.S. March 7, 1988).




To avoid previous problems caused by market changes and to ensure
an adequate supply of corn without expending substantial capital to build
new storage facilities, the company entered the futures market.'0 In the
fall of each year, the company purchased futures on the delivery of corn.
It would take delivery on the contracts if unable to obtain a supply of corn
and sell the remainder if a shortage failed to materialize." If a shortage
did occur, the company would sell the futures as it bought corn on the
spot market. Through this investment strategy, the company was able to
reach a balanced position as to any increase in spot corn prices.'
2
The company made a profit on its futures in some years but lost money
in others. 3 It originally reported these figures as ordinary profits and losses
for its manufacturing operations but later contended that the futures were
"capital assets" and that any gains or losses should be treated as arising
from the sale of capital assets.' 4 It justified its position by claiming that
the futures trading was a separate and distinct entity from its manufacturing
operations and that its futures transactions were not "hedges" or "specu-
lative dealings."' 5
The United States Tax Court rejected the company's arguments, finding
that the company's futures activ:ties were an integral part of its business,
designed to ensure a continued supply of corn with the additional benefit
of protecting against price increases.' 6 Corn Products appealed.
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
upheld the Tax Court's decision finding that there was no indication or
basis for determining that the futures constituted capital assets.' 7 On appeal
to the circuit court, Corn Products alleged that the commodity transactions
in question constituted property under Section 117(a) of the I.R.C. It further
argued that the courts had created a "judge-made exception" by denying
capital gains treatment for commodity futures transactions when used in
"hedging."' 8 The Commissioner, however, claimed that the petitioner's
commodity transactions were specifically excluded under Section 117(a) as
"inventory" and thus were not entitled to capital gains treatment. 9 The
court rejected Corn Products' arguments and held that gains or losses from
commodity transactions for commercial purposes do not receive capital gain
or loss treatment.
The Second Circuit closely examined the inventory exception under
Section 117(a). It found that where futures are used for the purpose of
10. Id.
11. Id. at 48-49.
12. Id. at 49.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 49-50.
16. Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 395, 399-400 (1951).
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speculation for legitimate capital transactions, they do not come within the
relevant exclusions of Section 117(a). In a hedge, however, such transactions
do come within the relevant exclusions because the hedge is used as part
of an inventory purchasing system whose purpose is to maintain a steady
inventory at a reasonable price. Such an inventory strategy is an integral
part of the manufacturing process, necessary to guarantee a sufficient supply
of raw materials for manufacturing. 20 The property or inventory is held not
for investment but for the protection of profit with the intent of disposing
of such material when the manufacturer's purpose has been achieved.
Consequently, the court concluded that material purchased under a hedge
cannot reasonably be separated from the inventory items and that the cost
of such operations must be considered part of the ultimate cost of the
goods.
2'
20. Id. at 516.
21. The court also rejected the contention that the "wash sales" provisions of Section
118 were applicable to the commodity transactions undertaken by Corn Products. It cited
Harriss v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1944), and Valley Waste Mills v. Page, 115
F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 681 (1941), as supporting its conclusion.
Section 118 prevented the deduction of losses sustained upon the sale and purchase of
shares of stock or securities, if the stock and securities purchased were substantially identical
to those sold. The court refused to accept the petitioner's argument that Section 118 was
applicable to the commodities transactions undertaken in Corn Products. In its decision the
Second Circuit quoted from the Tax Court's opinion:
Furthermore, a new future commodity contract is not 'substantially identical' with
any prior contract even though the quantity involved in each is identical. It would
be purely accidental if the new contract was with the same party as the one who
had agreed to sell the commodity in the earlier contract. The price would probably
be different and the delivery date would certainly be different.
Corn Prods. Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 215 F.2d at 516-17 (quoting 16 T.C. 395, 399-
400 (1951)).
The Second Circuit also cited the Tax Court's opinion for the proposition that commodities
futures contracts are not securities:
... it is apparent from the [Valley Waste Mills] opinion, that such a future is not
a security in any generally recognized sense but simply a contract between two parties
in which one agrees to supply at a designated time in the future, a stated quantity
and the quality of goods, upon payment of a stated price and on which a part of
the contract price, called a margin, has been paid by the buyer to his broker to
bind him until the sale is consummated or the contract is sold. (Emphasis supplied.)
Corn Prods., 215 F.2d at 517 (quoting 16 T.C. at 400).
The concept that a commodity futures contract is not a "security" is limited and must
be carefully examined. A commodities futures contract has been held not to be a security
within the meaning of the Securities Act where the purchaser of the contract relied solely on
the speculative hope that the market price of the underlying commodity would rise or fall.
SEC v. Commodity Options International, Inc., 553 F.2d 628, 632 (9th Cir. 1977); Glazer v.
National Commodity Research and Statistical Service, Inc., 547 F.2d 342, 343 (7th Cir. 1977);
McCurnin v. Kohlmeyer, 340 F. Supp. 1338, 1341-42 (E.D. La. 1972). A very thin line exists,
however, between a commodity futures contract and a security. An agreement authorizing a
person to buy and sell commodity futures on a profit sharing basis has been found to be a
security because the investors relied solely on the efforts of others to obtain profits. Ramsey
v. Arate, 406 F. Supp. 435, 438 (N.D. Tex. 1975). A naked double commodity option has
also been found to be a security. S.E.C. v. Commodity Options International, Inc., 553 F.2d
1232
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The Second Circuit stated that the tax treatment of hedges "is not a
judge-made exception' to Section 117(a); it is simply a recognition by the
courts that property used in hedging transactions properly comes within the
exclusions of the section."2 The court was careful to address the fact that
the commodity transactions in Corn Products did not constitute true hedging
and found that this difference was insignificant. The property purchased by
Corn Products Corporation was used for essentially the same purpose and
in the same manner as true hedging.? It maintained, however, that the
company's purpose had been to stabilize inventory costs and protect its
profit, regardless of whether complete or partial insurance was achieved. 24
On certiorari the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions.?
It concluded that there was no justification for the company's argument
that its futures activities were conducted separately and distinctly from its
manufacturing business. The Court emphasized that the futures purchases
constituted a form of insurance and that the company was still vulnerable
to rises in the price of corn.?
The Supreme Court accepted the lower courts' findings that the futures
"constitute[d] an integral part of its manufacturing business," but placed
less emphasis on their conclusion that the commodity transactions were an
integral part of the business because they were part of the inventory system. 27
Instead, the Court reasoned that capital gains treatment should be applied
only to those transactions where the property involved is not a usual source
of business income. It stated that the definition of a "capital asset" must
be narrowly applied and that its exclusions should be broadly construed.
28
The Corn Products opinion cited previous letter rulings and decisions holding
that gains and losses from "hedging transactions" should be treated as
ordinary business gains and losses, as justifying its conclusions.
29
628, 632-33 (9th Cir. 1977).
For a discussion of what constitutes a "security", see Neuwirth Inv. Fund, Ltd. v.
Swanton, 422 F. Supp. 1187, 1194 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 274 F.
Supp. 624, 642 (D.D.C. 1967); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(10) (Supp. 1986) (§ 3 of Securities
Exchange Act of 1934); I.R.C. § 6323(h) (1982); U.C.C. § 8-102(1) (1978).
22. Corn Prods., 215 F.2d at 516.
23. Id. at 516-17.
24. Id.
25. Corn Prods. Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 54 (1955).
26. Id. at 51.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 52. Section 117 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1940 defined "capital asset"
as:
held by the taxpayer (whether or not connected with his trade or business), but does
not include stock in trade of the taxpayer or other property of a kind which would
properly be included in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the
taxable year, or property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the
ordinary course of his trade or business, or property, used in the trade or business,
of a character which is subject to the allowance for depreciation provided in section
23() ....
29. 350 U.S. at 52-53; see Gen. Couns. Mem. 17,322 (1936).
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The Supreme Court's unanimous ° decision in Corn Products indicates
the Court's narrow interpretation of "capital asset." ' 3' This interpretation
resulted from the Court's desire to uphold Congress' intent that profits and
losses arising in the every day operation of a business be treated as ordinary
income or loss rather than capital income or loss.
32
II. THE DICHOTOMY AMONG THE Corn Products PROGENY
The Corn Products decision has been interpreted by a number of
jurisdictions including various federal circuit courts, the United States Tax
Court, and the United States Court of Claims.3 3 These jurisdictions have
not been unanimous in their conclusions, however, giving rise to great
disparity.
3 4
A. The "Substantial Investment Motive" Test
One of the most important interpretations of the Corn Products doctrine
was made in W. W. Windle Co. v. Commissioner.3 5 In W. W. Windle, a
processor of raw woolen stock promulgated the incorporation of a company
to manufacture its product into cloth. The Windle Company had been faced
with declining sales and encouraged the creation of the company to purchase
its products. In doing so the Windle Company acquired seventy-two percent
of the new corporations stock. 36 Ten years after its formation, however,
the captive corporation was liquidated because of consistent operating losses.
Consequently, Windle's stock interest became worthless, and it attempted
to claim this loss as an ordinary loss.
37
The United States Tax Court concluded that "stock purchased with a
substantial investment purpose is a capital asset even if there is a more
substantial business motive for the purchase. ' 38 It acknowledged that Windle
had had a legitimate business purpose in creating a captive company to
offset its declining sales but emphasized that Windle expected the company
to become a profitable corporation thereby causing its initial investment to
appreciate substantially.
3 9
The court emphasized that where a substantial investment motive exists
in a predominantly business acquisition of corporate stock, such stock is a
30. The decision was 8-0 with Justice Harlan abstaining.
31. Traditionally the Court has construed narrowly the definition of a "capital asset."
See Kieselbach v. Commissioner, 317 U.S. 399, 403 (1943); Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S.
28, 31 (1941).
32. Corn Prods., 350 U.S. at 52. See generally Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 106
(1932).
33. See infra notes 35-123 and accompanying text.
34. Id.
35. 65 T.C. 694 (1976).
36. Id. at 696.
37. Id. at 702.
38. Id. at 712.
39. Id. at 713.
1234
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capital asset. 40 It stated that even though Windle's investment motive might
have changed when the corporation began to experience economic problems,
the assets would still be capital assets. 41
More recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
in Roth Steel Tube Co. v. Commissioner2 found that a substantial invest-
ment motive may exist at the time of the acquisition of stock or during the
period in which stock is retained. 43 In Roth the Roth Steel Tube Company
acquired a sixty-two percent interest in Remco Industries, Inc. which man-
ufactured children's toys. Remco subsequently suffered serious financial
problems which required Roth to provide an additional infusion of capital.
Remco eventually ceased operations and Roth claimed an ordinary loss on
its investment in Remco stock as well as for the advances made to Remco.
The Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service maintained that the
losses suffered by Remco were capital losses and not ordinary losses.
44
The United States Tax Court concluded that the amounts paid to acquire
the stock of Remco and the advances made to it were capital in nature and
that the losses suffered were capital losses. 45 On appeal the Sixth Circuit
upheld the Commissioner's reasoning, finding that Roth's loss on its in-
vestment in Remco stock was a capital loss rather than an ordinary loss
because Roth purchased the stock as an investment. 46 It concluded that the
Tax Court's opinion, that a business purpose must persist without a sub-
stantial investment purpose throughout the purchase and holding period if
the gain or loss is to be characterized as an ordinary gain under the Corn
Products doctrine, was not clearly erroneous. 47
One of the first interpretations of the Corn Products doctrine by the
United States Court of Claims occurred in Dearborn Co. v. United States.48
In Dearborn the Dearborn Company, a furniture manufacturer, acquired a
total of 82,802 shares of a woodworking company. It later sold the stock
40. Id. at 712.
41. Id. at 713-14. In a more recent application, the United States Tax Court held that
shares of capital stock will be treated as capital assets so long as there was a substantial
investment purpose for holding them, even though a business purpose was predominant.
Mariani Frozen Foods Inc. v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 448, 480-81 (1983). The court recognized
that a corporation's reasons for holding an asset may change over a period of time and thus
the shareholder's intent for holding the stock must be made with reference to the corporation's
reasons for holding the stock in the period during which the stock was sold. Id. at 479-80.
Although the court found that the company's shares were held predominantly for investment
motives, it cited Windle for the proposition that if a substantial investment motive had existed,
the shares would have been treated as capital assets. Id. at 481 n.25.
42. 800 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1986).
43. Id. at 630-32.
44. Id. at 626-29.
45. Roth Steel Tube Co. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 698, 706 (1985). The court
stated: "[a] substantial investment motive at the time of acquisition or retention of the stock
requires treatment as a capital asset." Id.
46. Roth Steel Tube Co. v. Commissioner, 800 F.2d at 632.
47. Id.
48. 444 F.2d 1145 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
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at a loss and claimed an ordinary loss because it had purchased the stock
in the ordinary course of business. The Dearborn Company argued that its
actions were an integral and necessary act in conducting its furniture
business.4 9 The company's motivation in purchasing the stock was to obtain
management control of the production supply facilities of the manufacturer,
including a multi-year contract for the supply of hardwood timber.5 0 The
Commissioner rejected these arguments, however, and concluded that the
company acquired the stock with a substantial investment purpose and
maintained this purpose until its disposition of the stock. 5'
The Court of Claims concluded that the Dearborn Company acquired
the stock and management control in order to receive revenue from the
stock and to generate fee income from managing the supplier. 52 Thus, the
court determined that the Dearborn Company was motivated by a substantial
investment purpose even though it was also concerned with the acquisition
of supply and production facilities. The Dearborn court emphasized that
because the company was motivated by a substantial investment motive, the
stock it acquired was a capital asset even though the principal reason for
acquiring the stock was to acquire the company's supply and production
facilities, a business purpose.5
3
In a subsequent case, Agway, Inc. v. United States 4 (Agway 1), the
Court of Claims relied on Dearborn to uphold a corporation's claim to
capital gains treatment on the redemption of preferred stock in an agri-
cultural cooperative.55 In Agway 1, Agway, Inc., a corporation operating
as a farmer's cooperative, manufactured, purchased, and sold farm sup-
plies and equipment.56 Agway received shares of preferred stock in another
cooperative as part of its annual patronage refund from the second
cooperative. Subsequently, the shares were redeemed at a substantial profit
to Agway. 57 Agway sought a refund of its taxes on the grounds that the
gain on the redemption of its preferred stock in the agricultural cooperative
should have been taxed as capital gains rather than ordinary income.58
The IRS argued that the profit was ordinary income to the petitioner. 59
The Court of Claims, following earlier decisions, 6° concluded that the
income received by Agway from the redemption constituted a capital
49. Id. at 1147.
50. Id. at 1147-48.
51. Id. at 1148.
52. Id. at 1167-68.
53. Id.
54. 524 F.2d 1194 (Ct. CI. 1975).
55. Id. at 1201.




60. Dearborn Co. v. United States, 444 F.2d 1145 (Ct. CI. 1971); Waterman, Largen &
Co. v. United States, 419 F.2d 845 (Ct. C1. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 869 (1970);
FS Services, Inc. v. United States, 413 F.2d 548 (Ct. CI. 1969); Booth Newspapers, Inc. v.
United States, 303 F.2d 916 (Ct. CI. 1962).
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gain. 61 It refused to apply the Corn Products doctrine where there was a
"substantial investment motive" as well as the need to acquire a source
of supply.62 The court emphasized that "Corn Products will be applied in
this court to purchases of company stock to obtain a source of supply,
only if there is no substantial investment intent."
63
In a decision released the same day, 64 the Court of Claims expressed
an opinion which is difficult to reconcile with Agway L1 In Union Pacific
Railroad Co. v. United States,e6 the Union Pacific Railroad Company sought
a tax refund claiming that stock it held in certain subsidiary railroad
corporations did not constitute capital assets because the acquisition was
not "a mere investment unrelated to the business operations of the plaintiff.6 7
It was accomplished for an operating, business purpose, and the stock was
held as part of the operation of plaintiff's business as a railroad."' '
In analyzing Union Pacific, the Tax Court in W. W. Windle 9 concluded
"that the Court of Claims is currently of the view that the existence, or at
least the dominance, of a substantial business purpose for a stock acquisition
suffices to preclude capital asset status, whether or not there is a concurrent
hope of investment gain."' 70 Thus the Union Pacific decision appears to cast
serious doubt upon the continued acceptance of Dearborn and Agway I in
the Court of Claims.
7'
More recently the Court of Claims has decided Agway, Inc. v. The
United States (Agway II)72, which involved identical facts and issues to
those in Agway I except that the stock was issued and redeemed after the
1959 promulgation of Treasury Regulation Section 1.61-5.73 The Agway II
61. Agway I, 524 F.2d. at 1200.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1201. The court cited its previous holding in Penn Yan Agway Corp. v. United
States, 417 F.2d 1372 (Ct. Cl. 1969), with disapproval. It stated that there was no need to
convene an en banc court to formally overrule it. Id. at 1202.
64. The Agway I and Union Pacific decisions were both released October 22, 1975.
Judge Nichols wrote for the majority in Agway I with Judge Durfee concurring in part and
dissenting in part. In Union Pacific Judge Schwartz wrote for the majority with Judge Kunzig
adopting the majority decision with minor modifications and Judge Nichols concurring in part
and dissenting in part.
65. See supra notes 54-63 and accompanying text.
66. 524 F.2d 1343 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
67. Id. at 1359.
68. Id.
69. 65 T.C. 694 (1976); see supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
70. Windle, 65 T.C. at 711.
71. This interpretation has been widely accepted and was noted in the Tax Court's
decision in Windle, 65 T.C. at 710. Since Union Pacific was decided by the full court, with
only Judge Nichols, the author of the Agway I opinion dissenting, it appears more authoritative
than Agway I. Id. at 711; cf. Norton v. United States, 551 F.2d 821 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (contract
assuring logging business of a ready source of supply of timber was essential to and an integral
part of the logging business so that a business use intention rather than an investment intent
prevailed; gain on the sale of the contract was ordinary gain under Corn Products doctrine).
72. 81-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9700, 88,379 (Sept. 25, 1981).
73. Id. at 88,381.
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court stated that the case warranted the same result as Agway I except for
interpreting Treasury Regulation Section 1.61-5.74 Thus, Agway II infers
that sometime after the Union Pacific decision, the Court of Claims returned
to the use of the "substantial investment motive" test enunciated in Agway
L
The Internal Revenue Service has also expressed the opinion in a
Revenue Ruling75 that stock purchases held with a substantial investment
purpose are capital assets even though there was a more substantial business
motive for the purchases. 76 The IRS has since enforced this interpretation
through a number a private letter rulings77 which have applied the W. W.
Windle "substantial investment motive" test in varying factual contexts.78
B. The "Investment Motivated Purpose" Test
In contrast to those jurisdictions adopting the "substantial investment
motive" test, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has
created its own interpretation of the Corn Products doctrine. It has stated
that
if securities are purchased by a taxpayer as an integral and necessary
act in the conduct of his business, and continue to be so held until
the time of their sale, any loss incurred as a result thereof may be
fully deducted from gross income as a business expense or ordinary
loss. If on the other hand, an investment purpose be found to have
motivated the purchase or holding of the securities, any loss realized
upon their ultimate disposition must be treated in accord with the
capital asset provisions of the Code.7 9
This reasoning was set forth in the court's opinion in Campbell Taggert,
Inc. v. United States8 0 In Campbell Taggert, the Campbell Taggert Cor-
poration, a holding company, entered into an agreement to purchase fifty
percent of the stock of a foreign corporation. Later, Campbell Taggert
amended its agreement, purchasing twenty-five percent of the stock imme-
diately and the remaining twenty-five percent at a future date. Prior to
purchasing the remaining twenty-five percent, the corporation that was to
be purchased suffered severe financial setbacks. Campbell Taggert's attorney
advised the company that it was no longer obligated to consummate the
transaction because there had been a "material adverse change." 8' Campbell
74. Id.
75. Rev. Rul. 78-94, 1978-1 C.B. 58, revoking Rev. Rul. 75-13, 1975-1 C.B. 67.
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8,342,011 (July 15, 1983).
78. Id.
79. Campbell Taggert, Inc. v. United States, 744 F.2d 442, 456 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing
Technology Corp. v. United States, 443 F.2d 1115, 1120 (1971) and quoting Booth Newspapers
v. United States, 303 F.2d 916, 921 (Ct. CI. 1962)).
80. 744 F.2d 442 (5th Cir. 1984).
81. Id. at 444-45.
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Taggert, however, purchased the remaining stock to protect its business
reputation and goodwill. Shortly thereafter it sold the stock at a loss and
claimed an ordinary loss from the sale of the stock. The Commissioner
disallowed the loss and Campbell Taggert brought suit for a refund.1
2
Campbell Taggert claimed that because it lacked an investment motive
when it purchased the stock, it suffered an ordinary loss under the Corn
Products doctrine. 3 The Commissioner argued that the corporation's orig-
inal purpose in purchasing the stock, to acquire a capital asset, should
control the nature of the transaction. 4 The United States District Court for
the Northern District of Texas concluded that the corporation was entitled
to an ordinary loss from the sale of the stock. 85 It held that Campbell
Taggert's original investment motive was not determinative of whether the
subsequent sale of the stock was the sale of a capital asset where Campbell-
Taggert decided to complete the transaction to protect its goodwill as well
as its business reputation and the original investment motive played no part
in completing the bargain.
6
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held that because Campbell Taggert had the initial intent of purchasing the
stock for investment and had completed the transaction only to protect its
reputation and goodwill, it was entitled to take an ordinary loss on the
transaction. 7 The Campbell Taggert court recognized that a distinction
exists between individuals and corporations as to whether investment activ-
ities constitute a trade or business for the purpose of capital or ordinary
gain or loss treatment. 8 The court stated that the Corn Products doctrine
is triggered by finding a business purpose as opposed to investment purpose
in acquiring what would otherwise be a capital asset. Any inquiry into the
taxpayer's purpose requires an objective evaluation of all circumstances
surrounding the transaction including all relevant factors.8 9
One of the decisions on which the Campbell Taggert court based its
holding was the Fifth Circuit's decision in Schlumberger Technology Corp.
v. United States,90 which in turn was based on Booth Newspapers, Inc. v.
82. Id. at 444-46.
83. Id. at 446.
84. Id.
85. Cambell Taggert, Inc. v. United States, 552 F. Supp. 355 (N.D. Tex 1982).
86. Id. at 358.
87. Campbell Taggert, 744 F.2d at 460.
88. Id. at 453.
89. Id. at 458. Relevant factors include: the taxpayer's statements of its objective intent
at the time of the acquisition; the taxpayer's statements of its objective intent at the time of
disposition; the needs of the particular business; the length of time the asset was held; the
nature of the taxpayer's other business and investment activities; and the business and
investment advantages that might reasonably be expected to flow from the acquisition or
expenditure. Reliance on the taxpayer's purpose or motive, however, is not intended to place
ordinary capital treatment at the whim of the taxpayer. Id.
90. 443 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1971).
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United States.91 In Schlumberger, the taxpayer's primary business was the
measurement of physical phenomena of the earth and atmosphere to aid in
the discovery of oil, gas, and other minerals as well as for scientific space
exploration. 92 Because of the very specialized nature of its operations and
the high degree of reliability that was required by the purchasers of its
equipment, the taxpayer designed and manufactured its own equipment. 9
Schlumberger acquired stock in American Systems, Inc. (ASI), which was
organized for the purpose of designing, developing, manufacturing, and
programming electronic systems, equipment, and components for military
use. The Schlumberger Corporation believed that ASI's personnel could
help it in obtaining markets for its electronic equipment. Unexpected adverse
business conditions and ASI's failure to obtain any government contracts,
however, caused Schlumberger to sell the stock at a loss.
94
The Fifth Circuit held that while the taxpayer's investment in ASI was
not designed to protect and improve its original and primary business, its
investment did relate directly to a secondary business of obtaining large
systems contracts with the government. The taxpayer's investments in the
business were, therefore, integral and necessary acts in the conduct of its
business and were not motivated by an investment purpose.95 In reaching
its decision, the Fifth Circuit looked to whether losses incurred on a sale
of an asset are fully deductible as ordinary losses, creating a test which
considered whether the asset had been acquired as an integral and necessary
act in the conduct of business and continued to be so held until the time
of sale.9 6
The Schlumberger court cited Corn Products for the proposition that
transactions which are an integral part of the taxpayer's business give rise
to ordinary gains and losses, not capital gains and lossesY7 The court
explained that this "integrated business activities exception" was developed
in Booth Newspapers, Inc. v. United States.9 In Booth Newspapers a
newspaper publisher desired to guaranty a sufficient supply of newsprint.
91. 303 F.2d 716 (Ct. Cl. 1962). Booth Newspapers is a Court of Claims case which
applied the "investment motivated purpose" test rather than the "substantial investment
motive" test.
92. Schlumberger Technology Corp. v. United States, 443 F.2d 1115, 1116 (5th Cir.
1971).
93. Id. at 1117.
94. Id. at 1117-18.
95. Id. at 1121-22.
96. Id. at 1120-21.
97. Id. at 1119.
98. Id. at 1120; see Booth Newspapers Inc. v. United States, 303 F.2d 916 (Ct. Cl.
1962). Since Booth Newpapers, this doctrine has been utilized in several cases. See Steadman
v. Commissioner, 424 F.2d 1 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 869 (1970); Hollywood Baseball
Ass'n v. Commissioner, 423 F. 2d 494 (9th Cir. 1970); Waterman, Largen & Co. v. United
States, 419 F.2d 845 (Ct. Cl. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 869 (1970); John J. Grier Co. v.
United States, 328 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1964); Electrical Fittings Corp. v. Commissioner, 33
T.C. 1026 (1960); Pittsburgh Reflector Co. v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.M 377 (1968); Helen M.
Livesley v. Commissioner, 19 T.C.M. 133 (1960).
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As a result of an unprecedented demand for newsprint and a subsequent
shortage, Booth and another newspaper purchased 100% of the stock of a
small paper mill to ensure their own source of supply of newsprint.99 When
Booth later assured itself of a newsprint supply, it sold the stock. I°°
The Booth Newpapers court articulated a test for determining whether
a transaction falls within the Corn Products exception:
if securities are purchased by a taxpayer as an integral and necessary
act in the conduct of his business, and continue to be so held until
the time of their sale, any loss incurred as a result thereof may be
fully deducted from gross income as ... [an] ordinary loss. If, on
the other hand, an investment purpose be found to have motivated
the purchase or holding of the securities, any loss realized upon
their ultimate disposition must be treated in accord with the capital
asset provisions of the Code. 01
The Booth Newspapers court held that rather than characterizing the
stock purchase as a mere purchase of plant and equipment, it was more
accurate to characterize it as the acquisition of a source of inventory. The
court therefore concluded that the stock purchase was motivated by business
considerations and was an integral act in the conduct of the company's
business. 102 In view of this finding, the Booth Newspapers court held that
the stock was not a capital asset and produced ordinary losses on its sale. 03
Relying on Booth Newspapers the Schlumberger court held that the
acquisition of the ASI stock was an integral and necessary act in the conduct
of the company's secondary business of obtaining government contracts1' 4
and, consequently, qualified for ordinary, rather than capital asset treat-
ment. 05 It is interesting to note that the Commissioner argued in the
Schlumberger case that the Fifth Circuit should apply the "temporary
business expedient" test-a test which considers whether the transactions
are necessary as a temporary business expedient such as to acquire an
inventory or protect a source of supply. 106
99. Booth Newspapers, 303 F.2d at 917.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 921.
102. Id. at 921-22.
103. Id. at 922.
104. Schlumberger Technology Corp. v. United States, 433 F.2d 1115, 1121-22 (5th Cir.
1971).
105. Id.
106. It is clearly discernable how this test was protracted from the Corn Products decision,
and it would probably be a successful test to the extent it was only applied to inventory
"expediencies" since these situations would keep the cases squarely within Corn Products and
Section 1221. In support of its "business experience test," the government cited numerous
cases. See Booth Newspapers, Inc. v. United States, 303 F.2d 916 (Ct. Cl. 1962); Commissioner
v. Bagley & Sewall Co., 221 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1955); Edwards v. Hogg, 214 F.2d 640 (5th
Cir. 1954); Chase Candy Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 521 (Ct. CL. 1954); Mid-State
Products Co. v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 696 (1954); Clark v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 48 (1952);
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C. A Narrow Reading of Corn Products
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected the
reasoning of the Campbell Taggertl'0 court in Arkansas Best Corp. v.
Commissioner.0 1 In Arkansas Best the Arkansas Best Corporation, a diver-
sified holding company, purchased sixty-five percent of the outstanding
stock of the National Bank of Commerce in 1968.0 9 As the result of
legislation enacted by Congress shortly thereafter,110 the corporation was
required to sell its stock. It encountered difficulty in selling the stock and
from 1969 to 1976 had to purchase further shares to stabilize the price of
the stock. Ultimately, in 1975, the corporation was able to sell most of its
stock but at a substantial loss."' On its tax return Arkansas Best claimed
an ordinary loss for the disposition of its stock. 12 The Commissioner
disallowed these ordinary losses, and Arkansas Best challenged his decision. M
Arkansas Best argued that it purchased the stock to protect its business
reputation and, therefore, was entitled to ordinary loss treatment for the
loss realized on the sale of the stock acquired after 1972.114 The tax court
found that the loss realized on the stock acquired between 1968 and 1972
was a capital loss but that the purchases made after 1972 were made to
protect the bank's business reputation which enabled the bank to take an
ordinary loss deduction." 5 It concluded that the stock acquisition from 1968
through 1972 was motivated primarily by investment purposes and that the
acquisition of stock from 1973 through 1976 was motivated primarily by
business purposes."
6
On appeal the Eighth Circuit reversed the Tax Court finding that the
losses sustained by Arkansas Best upon the sale of the stock were not
entitled to ordinary loss treatment regardless of the reason why the stock
Western Wine & Liquor Co. v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 1090 (1952).
In the alternative, the Commissioner argued for the implementation of the "protection
expansion test" which provides that an "acquisition made to protect an existing business would
qualify for ordinary loss treatment, while an acquisition made to expand the business would
qualify for capital loss treatment." Schlumberger Technology, 443 F.2d at 1120.
It is difficult to imagine, however, what temporary expediency has to do with the Corn
Products rule and one is left to wonder what "expediencies" other than inventory expediencies
taxpayers might argue are applicable. See Western Wine & Liquor Co. v. Commissioner, 18
T.C. 48 (1952).
107. Campbell Taggert v. United States, 744 F.2d 442 (5th Cir. 1984); see supra notes
80-90 and accompanying test.
108. 800 F.2d 215 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 1564 (1987).
109. Id. at 217.
110. Bank Holding Company Act, Pub. L. No. 91-607, Title 1, § 103, 84 Stat. 1763
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1841-50).




115. Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 640 (1984).
116. Id. at 654-58.
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was acquired." 7 The court concluded that the stock held by Arkansas Best
was a capital asset because it did not fall into one of the categories excluded
from the definition of a "capital asset" by Section 1221118 of the I.R.C. 119
The Arkansas Best court interpreted Corn Products as neither requiring
nor permitting courts to decide if capital stock can be anything other than
a capital asset under Section 1221.120 The court stated that courts lack the
authority to decree exceptions to Section 1221 that Congress did not choose
to make. 121 In so holding, the court directly rejected the Fifth Circuit's
reasoning in Campbell Taggert.122 Furthermore, it criticized the use of the
Corn Products doctrine by previous courts because it "foster[ed] subjectivity
and uncertainty" in the tax laws, "leading to increased recourse to the
administrative and judicial processes to resolve conflicting contentions about
taxpayers' motivations in purchasing capital stock."12
117. Arkansas Best, 800 F.2d at 221.
118. I.R.C. § 1221 (Supp. 1986). Section 1221 of the Internal Revenue Code provides:
For purposes of this subtitle, the term "capital asset" means property held by
the taxpayer (whether or not connected with his trade or business), but does not
include
(1) stock in trade of the taxpayer or other property of a kind which would
properly be included in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the
close of the taxable year, or property held by the taxpayer primarily for
sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business;
(2) property, used in his trade or business, of a character which is subject to
the allowance for depreciation provided in section 167, or real property
used in his trade or business;
(3) a copyright, a literary, musical, or artistic composition, a letter or memo-
randum, or similar property, held by
(A) a taxpayer whose personal efforts created such property,
(B) in the case of a letter, memorandum, or similar property, a taxpayer
for whom such property was prepared or produced, or
(C) a taxpayer in whose hands the basis of such property is determined,
for purposes of determining gain from a sale or exchange, in whole
or part by reference to the basis of such property in the hands of
a taxpayer described in subparagraph (A) or (B);
(4) accounts or notes receivable acquired in the ordinary course of trade or
business for services rendered or from the sale of property described in
paragraph (1);
(5) a publication of the United States Government (including the Congressional
Record) which is received from the United States Government or any
agency thereof, other than by purchase at the price at which it is offered
for sale to the public, and which is held by:
(A) a taxpayer who so received such publication, or
(B) a taxpayer in whose hands the basis of such publication is deter-
mined, for purposes of determining gain from a sale or exchange,
in whole or in part by reference to the basis of such publication in
the hands of a taxpayer described in subparagraph (A).
119. Arkansas Best, 800 F.2d at 218.
120. Id. at 221.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 220-21.
123. Id. at 221.
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The Supreme Court, in a very short opinion, affirmed the Eight Circuit's
decision. It concluded that "a taxpayer's motivation in purchasing an asset
is irrelevant to the question" of whether the asset falls within the broad
definition of a "capital asset" under Section 1221.2 4 The Arkansas Best
Court rejected the argument that Corn Products stood for the proposition
that any asset acquired and held for business purposes should be entitled
to ordinary asset treatment. It concluded that Corn Products must be viewed
for the narrow holding that any hedging transaction, which is an integral
part of a business' inventory-purchase system falls within Section 1221's
property exception allowing the asset to be included in the taxpayer's
inventory. 25
Because Arkansas Best was not a securities dealer, its stock fell outside
Section 1221's inventory exception. The stock clearly fell within Section
1221's definition of a "capital asset" and was thus outside the classes of
excluded property. Consequently, the loss arising from its sale was found
to be a capital loss. 26
The Court correctly recognized that Corn Products involved an appli-
cation of Section 1221's inventory exception. Furthermore, it made the
important distinction that in Corn Products the futures transactions were
an integral part of the company's business and a hedge against future price
increases. It specifically stated that "Corn Products... has no application
to [the Arkansas Best] case."' 2 7 The Arkansas Best Court also noted that
a business connection is only important "in determinig the applicability of
certain of the statutory exceptions including the inventory exception." In
doing so, the Court rejected the use of the business motive test.
124. Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 56 U.S.L.W. 422 (U.S. March 7, 1988). A
number of tests had previously been proposed for the proper application of the Corn Products
doctrine. See generally Irwin v. United States, 558 F.2d 249, 252 (5th Cir. 1977) ("motive...
to promote [taxpayer's] business"); FS Services, Inc. v. United States, 413 F.2d 548, 554 (Ct.
Cl. 1969) ("proper and valid business considerations rather than an intent to make a capital
investment"); Mansfield Journal Co. v. Commissioner, 274 F.2d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1960)
("motive ... of a capital investor ... [or] of a far-sighted manufacturer"); John J. Grier
Co. v. United States, 328 F.2d 163, 165 (7th Cir. 1964) ("incident to conduct of... business
and not for investment"); Booth Newspapers, Inc. v. United States, 303 F.2d 716, 721 (Ct.
Cl. 1962) ("eminently reasonable [business] expedient," not "investment-minded"); Pittsburg
Reflector Co. v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.M. 377, 379 (1968) ("investment purpose" or "directly
related to ... business"); Tulane Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 1146,
1150 (1955) ("reasonable and necessary act in the conduct of its business.")
Cases that contain "necessary and integral act" language seem to utilize the phrase as a
synonym for "business purpose." On one hand, they contrast business motive with investment
motive, while on the other, they speak in terms of a necessary and integral business act as
the antithesis of an act motivated by an investment purpose. See, e.g., Midland Distributors,
Inc. v. United States, 481 F.2d 730, 734 (5th Cir. 1973) ("taxpayer purchased the assets as an
integral and necessary act in the conduct of its business rather than being motivated by an
investment purpose.")





III. THE APPLICATION OF THE Corn Products Docnm
I.R.C. Sections 117 and 1221128 exclude from the definition of "capital
asset" stock in trade, inventory, and property held primarily for sale to
customers.1 29 Interpreting these exclusions, in light of Section 1221, the
Second Circuit in Corn Products held that gain and loss from commodity
futures transactions will not be given capital treatment when they have been
utilized for commercial purposes such as "hedging."' 3 0
"Hedging" is a method of dealing in commodities futures whereby a
person or business protects itself against price fluctuations at the time of
delivery of the product which the individual or entity buys or sells.' 31 The
Second Circuit in Corn Products described three sub-categories of hedging:
speculation, legitimate capital transaction, and hedging. 3 2 According to the
Second Circuit, in a hedge, property is used in such a manner as to come
within the Section 1221 exclusion "for it is a part of the inventory purchase
system which is utilized solely for the purpose of stabilizing inventory cost.
As such it can not reasonably be separated from the inventory items .... ,,133
Consequently, the tax treatment of hedges under Corn Products is not a
"judge-made exception" to Section 1221.134 The Corn Products Court simply
recognized that property used in a hedging transaction falls within the
Section 1221 capital asset exclusion for inventory.135
128. I.R.C. Section 1221 (Supp. 1986) is identical for our purposes to I.R.C. Section
117(a)(1954) which was in effect at the time of the Corn Products decision. For purposes of
consistency, the text will refer to Section 1221 instead of Section 117(a) hereinafter.
129. See supra notes 28 and 118.
130. Corn Prods. Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 215 F.2d 513, 515 (2d Cir. 1954).
131. Id.; see also United States v. N.Y. Coffee and Sugar Exchange, 263 U.S. 611 (1924).
132. The Corn Products court borrowed these classifications from N.Y. Coffee, Corn
Prods., 215 F.2d at 56, (citing N.Y. Coffee, 263 U.S. at 619). Since then, these classifications
have been adopted as informal guidelines to determine the proper tax treatment of futures
transactions. See generally Trenton Cotton Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 33 (6th Cir.
1945); Covington v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 601, aff'd, 120 F.2d 768 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
315 U.S. 822 (1941); Farmers & Ginners Cotton Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 1083,
rev'd, 120 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1940); Makransky's Estate v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 397, aff'd,
154 F.2d 59 (3rd Cir. 1946); Tennessee Egg Co. v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 558 (1942).
133. Corn Products, 215 F.2d at 516. The Supreme Court in Corn Products relied on
General Counsel Memorandum 17,322 to distinguish "speculative transactions in commodity
futures" from "hedging transactions." Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350
U.S. 46, 52 (1955). That Memorandum ruled that hedging transactions were essentially
"insurance" rather than a dealing in capital assets, and gains and losses were, therefore,
ordinary. See id. at 52-53.
134. See, e.g., Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 56 U.S.L.W. 4229, (U.S. March
7, 1988).
135. See Corn Products, 215 F.2d at 516. The Supreme Court stated that "admittedly,"
the corn futures were not actual inventory and, therefore, were not within the literal language
of Section 117(a). The Court then held that the exclusions under Section 117(a) should be
interpreted broadly. Corn Prods., 350 U.S. at 51, 52. It then turned immediately to a discussion
of hedging transactions. See id. at 52-53.
The courts deciding Corn Products issues after Corn Products seized upon the Supreme
Court's analysis of Congress' intentions in enacting Section 117(a) to expand the Corn Products
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The question, therefore, that the courts attempting to apply the Corn
Products doctrine should have asked is: was the taxpayer involved in a
hedging transaction in which property was used as part of an inventory
purchase system solely for the purpose of stabilizing inventory costs? If the
answer is yes, then the property falls within the broadly construed exclusion
for inventory set forth in Section 1221. If the answer is no, the property
does not properly fall under Section 1221 or, therefore, within the Corn
Products doctrine.
What have the courts done with the Corn Products doctrine? A study
of existing case law indicates that most courts have focused on an entirely
different question. Instead of focusing on the inventory exception of Section
1221, the courts have moved to a more easily manipulated issue-motive.
3 6
By focusing on the taxpayer's motive, (business motive versus investment
motive), the courts, after Corn Products, have indeed created a judge-made,
non-statutorily based exception.
Do any of the cases following Corn Products actually fall within the
Corn Products doctrine? Do the facts of W. W. Windle'17 fit within the
inventory exclusion of Section 1221 as broadly construed by the Corn
Products Court? The Windle Company bought stock in a manufacturing
company in order to secure a market for its unprocessed products."' The
Tax Court concluded that since the stock acquisition had a substantial
investment motive which counterbalanced a more predominant business
motive, the stock did not fit within the Corn Products doctrine and was,
therefore, capital in nature.
39
The "substantial investment motive" test used in W. W. Windle'40 was
derived from the Supreme Court's reliance in Corn Products on an inter-
doctrine beyond the scope of the Section 117(a) inventory exception, to encompass any expense
which is an integral part of the taxpayer's business. See, e.g., Campbell Taggert, Inc. v.
United States, 744 F.2d 442, 448 (5th Cir. 1984). The opportunity for this type of expansive
reading was left open by the Supreme Court since it was not as explicit as the lower courts
in its emphasis of the inventory exception of Section 117(a). The Court's emphasis of the
broad construction of exceptions to Section 117(a) was noted and expanded beyond any basis
in inventory. Id.
136. This line of reasoning arose as a result of the wording of the Supreme Court's
opinion in Corn Products. See Corn Products, 350 U.S. at 52; see also, e.g., Wright v.
Commissioner, 756 F.2d 1039, 1041-42 (4th Cir. 1985); Campbell Taggart, 744 F.2d at 458;
Agway, Inc. v. United States, 524 F.2d 1194, 1201 (Ct. Cl. 1975); Union Pacific Railroad
Company, Inc. v. United States, 524 F.2d 1343, 1355-599 (Ct. Cl. 1975); Midland Distributors,
Inc. v. United States, 481 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1973); Dearborn Company v. United States, 444
F.2d 1145, 1166 (Ct. Cl. 1971); Schumberger Technology Corp. v. United States, 443 F.2d
1115, 1121 (1971); Booth Newspapers, Inc. v. United States, 303 F.2d 916, 921 (Ct. Cl. 1962);
W. W. Windle Company v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 694, 707-14 (1976); Electrical Fittings
Corp. v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 1026, 1031 (1960). But see Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commis-
sioner, 800 F.2d 215, 221 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 1564 (1987).
137. W. W. Windie Co. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 694 (1976); see supra notes 35-41 and
accompanying text.
138. Id. at 695-703.
139. Id. at 704.
140. Id. at 704-12.
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pretation of Congress' intent in drafting Section 1221.1 41 Unfortunately, the
Supreme Court's focus on the intent of Section 1221 and whether it should
be construed broadly or narrowly obscured the Court's more important
point. As more clearly stated in the Second Circuit's Corn Products opinion,
the primary issue was whether the item falls within an exception to Section
1221.142 A secondary question was whether the inventory exclusion should
be broadly construed to include the hedging expenses of the Corn Products
Company within the definition of "inventory." The question the court
asked in order to ascertain whether the future contracts were in essence
inventory was whether the transaction constituted an integral part of the
taxpayer's ordinary business operations. 43 This second question was only
significant in so far as it shed light on whether the items were inventory.
The question as to whether or not there was a business motive standing
alone is meaningless in the context of what the Corn Products Court
narrowly ruled. Furthermore, the question is misleading in that it broadens
the scope of the Corn Products opinion beyond the field of hedging and
its uses for bolstering inventory.144
The primary issue is not, as W. W. Windle stated, "whether the
securities were purchased not for investment, but for business reasons.' ' 4
To shift the focus in this manner obscures the factually narrow holding of
Corn Products. What the Corn Products Court did say was that the
commodities futures purchases were found to " 'constitute an integral part
of its manufacturing business .... ,,6 This finding was important in that
it exposed the issue of whether the futures contracts could be construed as
inventory, as it is broadly construed under Section 1221 and its legislative
history. The business purpose was, then, a secondary issue, important only
to the extent that illustrated that the contracts were in actuality held as
inventory.
The W. W. Windle court focused on the "motive" rather than the
inventory exclusion of Section 1221 and, thus, set in motion a judge-made
exception never intended by the Corn Products Court. 47 Later courts
applying a "motive" test to resolve a Corn Products doctrine issue cite
W. W. Windle 48 or Booth Newspapers49 to support the proposition that
141. Id. at 706-12.
142. Corn Prods. Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 215 F.2d 513, 514-16 (2d. Cir. 1954).
143. Id. at 516.
144. See Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. at 46.
145. W. W. Windle, 65 T.C. at 707.
146. Corn Products, 350 U.S. at 51.
147. W. W. Windle, 65 T.C. at 703-714.
148. The W. W. Windle court cited Booth Newspapers, Inc. v. United States, 303 F.2d
916 (Ct. C1. 1962), as justifying its reasoning.
[I]f securities are purchased by a taxpayer as an integral and necessary act in the
conduct of his business, and continue to be so held until the time of their sale, any
loss incurred as a result thereof may be fully deducted from gross income as a
business expense or ordinary loss. If, on the other hand, an investment purpose be
found to have motivated the purchase or holding of the securities, any loss realized
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such a test is relevant. 15 0 These courts have strayed from the narrow
holding of Corn Products and perpetuated tests which "lack a basis in
the statutory language ....
If the W. W. Windle court had focused instead on whether or not the
stock bought could be broadly construed as inventory, the court probably
would have arrived at the same answer-the stock does not fall within the
inventory exclusion and is, therefore, capital-but would have set forth a
more narrow holding, less subject to manipulation by the judiciary, tax-
payers, and the Commissioner. The W. W. Windle court should have
concluded under the Corn Products doctrine that the stock was not used
as a hedge since it was not used in such a manner as to be within the
Section 1221 inventory exclusion. The stock could not be considered a part
of an inventory purchase system which was utilized solely for the purpose
of stabilizing inventory costs, so that the stock could not reasonably be
separated from the raw woolen inventory items.152
Although the W. W. Windle court shifted its focus to motive, their
analysis was successful. By focusing on the facts showing that the taxpayer
bought the stock not only to ensure a market for its products (and, therefore,
to enhance production of its inventory), but also as an investment in the
operations of a corporation, the court in a circuitous way found that the
stock was not purchased solely for the purpose of stabilizing inventory
costs. The court, therefore, produced the right result but for the wrong
reason.153 The analysis was correct but the focus was wrong. This has
created problems in subsequent cases which perpetuated the wrong reasoning
and sometimes produced an incorrect result.
In contrast to W. W. Windle, the Booth Newpapers decision applied
the Corn Products doctrine accurately. The Booth Company's purchase of
stock to secure a supply of newsprint was described by the Court of Claims
as an integral and necessary act in the conduct of its business and, therefore,
upon their ultimate disposition must be treated in accord with the capital asset
provisions of the Code.
W. W. Windle, 65 T.C. at 708 (citing Booth Newspapers, 303 F.2d at 921).
149. 303 F.2d 916 (Ct. CI. 1962).
150. See, e.g., Wright v. Commissioner, 756 F.2d 1039, 1041-42 (4th Cir. 1985); Campbell
Taggert, Inc. v. United States, 744 F.2d 442, 456 (5th Cir. 1984); Agway, Inc. v. United
States, 524 F.2d 1194, 1200 (Ct. Cl. 1975); Union Pacific R.R. v. United States, 524 F.2d
1343, 1359 (Ct. Cl. 1975); Midland Distributors, Inc. v. United States, 481 F.2d 730 (5th Cir.
1973); Dearborn Co. v. United States, 444 F.2d 1145, 1166-68 (Ct. Cl. 1971); Schlumberger
Technology Corp. v. United States, 443 F.2d 1115, 1120-21, nn.7-8 (1971); Electrical Fittings
Corp. v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 1026, 1031 (1960).
151. See Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 800 F.2d 215 (8th Cir. 1986), cert.
granted, 107 S. Ct. 1564 (1987).
152. See W. W. Windle, 65 T.C. at 706; see also supra notes 38-44 and accompanying
text.
153. This reasoning applies equally to the Roth Steel Tube case, and to the IRS's position
in Revenue Ruling 78-94. See Roth Steel Tube Co. v. Commissioner, 800 F.2d 625 (6th Cir.
1986); Rev. Rul. 78.94, 1978-1 C.B.58.
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ordinary rather than capital in nature. 5 4 While this is probably not the
desired conclusion, the Booth Newspapers court did base its decision in
Section 1221 by finding that the stock purchase was best characterized as
"the acquisition of a vital source of inventory."' 5 Thus, the Court of
Claims managed to keep its holding within the Corn Products Court's
narrow inventory exception, although its finding that stock, as opposed to
futures contracts, can be used as a hedge was probably erroneous.
5 6
A particularly egregious holding was set forth by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Campbell Taggert157 There the
court ruled that an investment company can avail itself of the Corn Products
rule of ordinary, rather than capital gain or loss, treatment for otherwise
capital asset transactions if there was no investment purpose when the asset
was acquired solely as an indirect means of acquiring a deductible business
expense. 58 The Campbell Taggert court's application of the "investment
motivated purpose" test not only obscured the Section 1221 statutory basis
of the Corn Products doctrine, but also broadened the doctrine5 9 in such
a way that it was no longer founded in Section 1221's inventory exception
but in the Section 162 business expense deduction.
6°
154. Booth Newspapers, Inc. v. United States, 303 F.2d 916, 921-22 (Ct. CI. 1962).
155. Id. at 922.
156. See infra notes 158-63 and accompanying text.
157. Campbell Taggert, Inc. v. United States, 744 F.2d 442 (5th Cir. 1984); see supra
notes 79-89 and accompanying text.
158. Campbell Taggert, 744 F.2d at 451. The Campbell Taggert court stated that the
business deduction section of the Internal Revenue Code, I.R.C. § 162 (1982), "defines the
boundaries of the narrowest formulation of the Corn Products doctrine.... ." See Campbell
Taggert, 744 F.2d at 452-53. Unfortunately, the court ignored the Corn Products decision's
grounding in Section 117(a)'s inventory exception which is certainly narrower than the Section
162 general business deduction section.
159. Ironically, the Fifth Circuit stated:
Corn Products involved the characterization of gain resulting from repetitive, every
day transactions 'vitally important to the taxpayer's business.' (citation omitted).
Subsequent decisions, however, have seized upon the Court's departure from the
constraints of the literal statutory definition and have applied its reasoning in a
variety of factual settings less compelling than that before the Court in Corn Products
itself.
Campbell Taggert, 744 F.2d at 450.
The court's first sentence, however, foreshadowed that it would follow those cases which
have departed from Corn Products since the court was obviously focused on gain from general
business operations rather than gain from hedging transactions used as a source of inventory.
160. The Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Schlumberger also ignored the Section 1221 statutory
basis of the Corn Products doctrine. The court's holding that stock purchases were integral
and necessary acts in the conduct of its business does not pursue the requirement that the
stock be linked to an inventory system and thus excepted from Section 1221 under Corn
Products. It is interesting to note that in so holding, the Schlumberger court ignored the
finding in Booth Newspapers, the case it cited as precedent, that the stock purchase in question
was most accurately characterized as an acquisition of a source of inventory. See Booth
Newspapers, Inc. v. United States, 303 F.2d 916, 921-22 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
Section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code of*1986 provides that "There shall be allowed
as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable
year in carrying on any trade or business. .. ." I.R.C. § 162 (Supp. 1986).
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The Fifth Circuit's conclusion in Campbell Taggert that the stock was
purchased without any investment motive led it to hold that the stock was
entitled to ordinary asset treatment.' 6' But even if the stock was bought for
a business purpose and was acquired solely as an indirect means of acquiring
a deductible business expense, one is left to wonder what happened to the
Corn Products requirement that the asset be bought and held as part of an
inventory system solely for the purpose of stabilizing inventory costs so that
it is not capital under Section 1221. Was the stock in this case used to
stabilize inventory? The only way a corporation can buy stock and hold it
as inventory, in the literal sense of the term, is if the corporation is a
broker-dealer. 6 2 The only way a corporation can buy stock and hold it as
inventory in the broad sense of that term so as to fall within the Section
1221 inventory exception is if the stock transaction can be characterized as
a hedge as set forth in Corn Products.
The possibility of hedging inventory with stock purchases seems virtually
unachievable because it is hard to imagine a situation where stock can be
bought and held solely to stabilize inventory in a manner such as that used
in commodities futures hedges. At the heart of a stock purchase is the
purchase of ownership of a corporation rather than the simple purchase of
a commodity. Even if a stock purchase is primarily motivated by a desire
to control a corporation to stabilize inventory, there will almost always be
an investment purpose in a stock purchase because the purchaser acquires
much more than what the Corn Products Court called "an inventory
system."
Allowing a taxpayer to testify that his sole purpose for purchasing stock
in a corporation was to secure a source of inventory only invites manipu-
lation of the standard. Like it or not, the purchaser is an owner, and as
such an investor with motives beyond inventory. Consequently, it will be a
rare case in which a court can say that stock is purchased as anything other
than a capital asset since the Corn Products doctrine cannot readily be
-applied to stock. Any interpretation that a corporation can hedge through
stock transactions carries the Corn Products doctrine beyond the realm of
its statutory basis in Section 1221.
IV. WiREm Do WE Go FROM HERE?
"We do not read Corn Products as either requiring or permitting the
courts to decide that capital stock can be anything other than a capital
asset under Section 1221."163 These are the words of the Eighth Circuit in
161. Campbell Taggert, 744 F.2d at 460.
162. Booth Newspapers held that except for stock sold by dealers in the usual course of
their business, capital stock does not fall within any of the express exclusions of Section 1221
which exclude from the concept of capital assets such items of property as stock in trade,
inventory, property held for sale to customers and depreciable real property used in a taxpayer's
trade or business. Booth Newspapers, 303 F.2d at 920.
163. Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 800 F.2d 215, 221 (8th Cir. 1986), cert.
granted, 107 S. Ct. 1564 (1987).
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its Arkansas Best opinion which the United States Supreme Court has
subsequently reviewed. 164 This statement exposes two major problems with
the Corn Products doctrine as it has been developed by the courts. First, a
finding that an asset is not a capital asset must be grounded in the statutory
exceptions set forth in Section 1221. Second, because of the nature of stock,
it does not fit readily within the inventory exception for commodities hedging
as proposed by the Corn Products Court.
While a typical application of the Corn Products doctrine states that
the definition of what is not a capital asset denies that status to assets
involved in transactions which constitute an integral part of the taxpayer's
ordinary business operations, 16 the Second Circuit's opinion in Corn Prod-
ucts demonstrates that this rule was used in the context of a hedging
transaction which could be statutorily based in the inventory exclusion of
Section 1221.166 The corn futures contracts in the Corn Products case
represented ownership of a commodity, and a commodity is inventory in
the broad sense because it is used as a stabilizing factor for an inventory
system. 67 On the other hand, stock represents ownership in a corporation.
Can a purchase of a corporation's stock be considered an inventory system
in the sense set forth in Corn Products? The analogy between commodities
and stock in the context of Section 1221 is a tenuous one.
By continually expanding the Corn Products doctrine to include factual
situations, such as the purchase of stock, which can not fit within the
inventory exception of Section 1221, the courts have used Corn Products
to create a judge-made exception. It was not the Corn Products Court
which created this exception, but the courts which subsequently have ma-
nipulated the Corn Products decision to allow the Corn Products doctrine
to apply to factual situations outside the commodity hedging transactions
for which the exception was created. Ironically, it was the court in W. W.
Windle which pointed out: "[w]ords are not infinitely elastic."' 16
While many of these cases have fostered the "right" result by holding
that stock should be a capital asset, the courts have been "led down the
garden path." The Corn Products court found that commodities hedges fall
within the inventory exception of Section 1221.169 In describing why com-
modities hedges are inventory, the Supreme Court looked at the motive of
the taxpayer.' 70 Because the corn futures were bought for business purposes,
they were not an investment.' 71 But the analysis must be taken one step
further; because the commodities futures bought for the business were in
essence inventory, the futures fall within the Section 1221 exception.
164. See Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 56 U.S.L.W. 4229 (U.S. March 7, 1988).
165. See, e.g., Booth Newspapers, 303 F.2d at 921.
166. Corn Prods. Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 215 F.2d 513, 516 (2d Cir. 1954).
167. Id.
168. W. W. Windle Co. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 694, 713 (1976).
169. Corn Products, 215 F.2d at 515-16.
170. Corn Prods. Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 51 (1955).
171. Id. at 51-52.
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The W. W. Windle,172 Campbell Taggert,73 and Schlumberger'74 courts
failed to make this final distinction. Yes, these stock holdings have, or do
not have, a business purpose without an investment purpose, but, above
and beyond that, can the stock be fit within the broadly construed Section
1221 exception for inventory because it is held by the business solely to
stabilize inventory?
Put in this context the answer with respect to stock transactions will
almost always be no. Stock purchases are purchases of ownership in a
business. Even if the purchaser is primarily concerned, as in W. W. Windle,
in stabilizing his inventory, there will most likely be an investment above
and beyond inventory in the purchase of stock. This additional investment
will necessarily make the stock purchase not solely for purposes of aug-
menting an inventory system.
For the first time in over 30 years, the Supreme Court reviewed the
Corn Products doctrine which it created. Their original holding has come
a long way and has been applied in a multitude of contexts since its
inception. In deciding Arkansas Best the Court heeded the Eighth Circuit's
admonishment that "the judiciary lacks authority to create exceptions to
Section 1221 that Congress did not choose to make.' 1 75 With this is mind,
the Court de-emphasized the "substantial investment motive" and "invest-
ment motivated purpose" tests and focused on the narrow holding of Corn
Products. The Court found that the Corn Products doctrine has been
expanded beyond the point where it can still be considered statutorily based.
The Corn Products doctrine was limited to the scope initially perceived by
the Supreme Court in 1956.176 The Court could not ground in statute a
finding that stock, rather than commodities, is anything other than capital
in nature.
V. CONCLUSION
In Arkansas Best Corporation v. Commissioner,7 7 the United States
Supreme Court clarified the ambiguities surrounding the use of the Corn
Products doctrine. The great diversity that existed among the district and
circuit courts had created confusion, inequitable results, and an unnecessary
burden on the judicial system in an attempt to establish the apportionment
of tax liability. The Court's Arkansas Best decision is important because it
will strongly impact the investment strategies of many businesses.
The Court's reasoning in the Arkansas Best decision rejects the reasoning
exhibited by the Corn Products progeny, recognizing that the Corn Products
172. 65 T.C. 694 (1976); see supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
173. 744 F.2d 442 (5th Cir. 1984); see supra notes 79-89 and accompanying text.
174. 443 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir 1971); see supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
175. Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 800 F.2d 215, 221 (8th Cir. 1986), 56
U.S.L.W. 4229 (U.S. March 7, 1988).
176. See generally Corn Products, 350 U.S. at 46-54.
177. Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 56 U.S.L.W. 4229 (U.S. March 7, 1988).
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progeny went beyond the intentions of the drafters of Section 1221, and
instead reaffirmed the narrow holding of Corn Products. The Arkansas
Best decision will restore the integrity of the Corn Products decision while
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